



In by now well-known words, Jacques Lacan once wrote: “The sender receives his own 
message back from the receiver in reversed form”.1 It is to speak of the way that it is the 
effect of our actions that reveals our original intentions in undertaking them. It is the one 
who responds to them who is their true ‘unconscious’ and who makes clear their meaning 
in a manner we are unable to. Thus, in Lacan’s famous reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s short 
story ‘The Purloined Letter’, it is the one who ends up holding the letter, no matter how 
accidental or inadvertent this seems, who must be understood as its proper addressee, the 
one for whom it was always intended. And this is the case too in ordinary life. When we 
gossip about someone and they eventually find out, we are not to blame the person who 
told them or deny that the hurt we caused was intended by us. Rather, the anger of 
the subject of our gossip tells us the truth of our motivations in speaking to others. 
Our unconscious and unadmitted message comes back to us in a circle, so that we 
realise that we were fundamentally always addressing only ourselves.
It is just this that occurred to photographer Bill Henson when the invitation to his exhibition 
was sent out by Roslyn Oxley9 Gallery, Sydney in May this year. Within days, his photographs 
were front page news when a number of them were seized by police, following complaints 
concerning their depictions of a naked teenage girl. At this point, Henson received his letter 
back in reversed form, not merely in the sense that the invitation image was obviously 
selected, whether by Henson himself or somebody at the Gallery, for its ability to shock, 
and this was obviously what it caused. In a more profound sense, we would say that the 
furore that erupted spoke the photographs’ truth, revealed their ‘unconscious’. In other 
words, it was those who complained about the photos who provided them with their best 
reading, not insofar as they objected to them and tried to silence them, but like any good 
analyst, they listened to them and let them speak.
Now what could we mean by this? In what sense would it be possible to argue that a 
vociferous child protection advocate like Hetty Johnson of Braverhearts offered the best 
insight into Henson’s photography? How is it that she in a positive sense, not in what she 
negated of the work but in what she repeated of it, put forward its proper explanation? 
How is it that an artistic illiterate like her was able to see what was at stake in a way 
that all those well-credentialled critics who defended the photographs were unable to? 
And how might we for our part—in at least my spontaneous reaction to the controversy
—seek to contest the assumptions of both? How to think about Henson’s photographs without 
being reduced either to agreeing with the child protection advocates attacking or with the 
art critics defending them? How to contest both Henson and Henson’s defenders while also 
opposing those who criticise him for exploiting children, understanding that these two sides 
have much more in common with each other than what separates them?
What is it in fact that Henson says about his own photography? In interviews, he speaks of 
his work as dramatising adolescence as the transition between childhood and adulthood, as 
that moment in life in which we first become aware of the mysteries of the world around us. 
It is a state that Henson’s critics describe in terms of the vulnerability of his subjects, their 
being exposed to greater forces both within and outside of them. They are confronted by a 
vast and indifferent power whose ultimate model is nature. When Henson puts together in 
his exhibitions images of naked adolescents, distant cloudscapes and urban wastelands, the 
connecting metaphor is the irrepressibility and incomprehensibility of nature. As novelist 
David Malouf writes: “[Henson’s photographs] affect us not as records of a pre-existing 
reality, nor as illustrations of some held view, but with the immediate otherness and mystery, 
and powerful and puzzling reality, of objects from another nature: that is, as works of art”.2 
It is a smallness in the face of an overwhelming nature that curator Judy Annear speaks of in 
terms of “the Romanticist interest in creating an effect of sublimity through the loss of self 
within nature”,3 although as she emphasises Henson’s version of the sublime is more modern 
and less nostalgic than that of the Romantics.
In other words, in a doubling we find elsewhere in Henson’s work, art itself is one of those 
great and mysterious truths that the subjects in his photos are subject to. It is perhaps no 
exaggeration to say that what we see in Henson’s photographs is his subjects seeing their 
own photographs of themselves or that what Henson is ultimately photographing is the 
spectators to his own photographs. It is something like this, I think, that accounts for the 
overwhelming, indeed almost claustrophobic, discourse of “art” that surrounds the discussion 
of Henson’s work—not only are the photos themselves seen to be artistically highly wrought, 
but art itself appears as the very subject of the work. We find this discourse in the critics’ 
desire to find the signs of traditional fine art in Henson’s technique as part of the justification 
for counting photography as art, with for example the colour applied like a kind of patina or 
make-up to many of his images. But we also find it in the recent controversy in the assertion 
that because his work is art it cannot be pornography. It is the idea that art allows—or should 
allow—a space for the contemplation of or reflection upon things we would otherwise find 
disturbing or confronting. (This argument exists in tension with the equally strong impulse 
in Henson towards the transcending of the medium in the desire to make the objects in 
his photographs absolutely real, as though we shared the same three-dimensional space as 
them.)
Indeed, the sense of overwhelming natural forces is given superb expression and amplitude 
by Henson—the grainy swirl of the prints, the blurring or shaking of the camera’s focus, the 
tenebrous shades and gradations of the photos’ development. All these elements work to 
conjure up a hostile, threatening world that is beyond our grasp, a world of shadows and 
dimly apprehended forces that lie just beyond the known. But there are also shadows within 
what we see, dark forces crossing the faces and bodies in the photos, producing for reasons 
we cannot guess states of fear, despair, ecstasy and exaltation. Even the rare moments of 
self-possession in the photos come to appear mysterious, inexplicable, the effect of 
something else outside of the image. We have in Henson’s work a definitive image of 
humanity literally and metaphorically stripped bare, reduced to a primal, presocial, 
almost Hobbesian state, isolated or clinging together in despairing and disconsolate groups 
against the encroaching darkness. This is how the notion of adolescence ultimately works 
in Henson—as a figure for all of us confronted by the overwhelming mystery of the world. 
We live permanently in state of adolescent yearning and uncertainty, of being continuously 
formed and deformed. The human is understood as a momentarily cathected collection of 
impulses, at which their possessor can only gaze with anguish and incomprehensibility. 
If we were looking for literary equivalents to Henson’s world, it would not be to the usually 
adduced high-art Thomas Bernhard or W.G. Sebald, but to someone like Michel Houllebecq 
and his book Atomized (although admittedly, in a darker, less Pop Art idiom). In the words 
of The New Yorker critic Peter Schjeldahl, another long-term Henson admirer: “The chemical 
and mineral world in continuously roiling emulsion with light and darkness is an ultimate 
symbol for the kaleidoscopic identicalness that so disquiets when Henson discovers it in 
the human scene… What is that face, breaking our hearts, but a momentary configuration 
of molecules taking form and changing form and losing form?”4
Indeed, as has often been pointed out by the more perceptive commentators on Henson’s 
work, this contingency or decomposition is doubled by the invariably distant, long-focused 
gaze onto Henson’s scenes. There is a faraway, unseen point of view of which the characters 
in the photos are unaware; and even when these characters are photographed close-up 
(and even when they appear to be looking at us), it is still as though they cannot see us, 
as though we are protected by the darkness surrounding us. (Undoubtedly the high point 
of this approach is the Paris Opera series of 1990–91.) Again, this distant gaze is not so much 
directly threatening as it is simply enigmatic, unknowable. It retreats from the scene like an 
absent God refusing to judge his subjects, withdrawing with it all moral surety or direction. 
Henson’s figures are alone, with no relation beyond the physical, even to the one who sees 
them. Sydney’s Art Gallery of New South Wales director Edmund Capon exaggerates a little 
when he speaks of the images as a “celebration of amorality”, but only a little.5
In fact, there is an implicit tension in Henson’s work because at the same time as there 
is meant to be no indication of any active intervention in the scene, the images are highly 
shaped by Henson. His bodies adopt a whole series of poses from the history of art; they 
constitute what has been called a “gestuary”.6 It is in the earlier work, like the two 
hundred and twenty gelatin silver prints of the 1980–82 Untitled series, in which Henson 
picks out a face from a crowd by putting it in focus, that there is much more emphasis on 
the constructive, individualising power of the camera. It is the camera itself that puts the 
subject in focus, with the rest of the field, as in the later photographs, a vaguely threatening 
force or pressure. Or at least, we cannot distinguish the self-focusing or self-absorption 
we see on the faces there from the external focusing of the camera. The subject is not 
merely subjected or subjectivised, but self-formation or self-subjectivisation is henceforth 
indistinguishable from a kind of social apparatus or capture. Henson here, for all of his later 
distance towards what he calls “critique”,7 is undoubtedly influenced by the Foucault-style 
arguments that were then circulating around photographic discourse in Australia, the notion 
of a certain “eye of power” that produced self-regulating individuals.
How then, might we summarise Henson’s career? What is the trajectory that connects his 
earlier work to the later? Against all those who speak of the aesthetic affect of Henson’s 
work, the mastery and ravishments of his photographic technique—although we must not 
forget for a moment that these are also a form of discipline wrought against his bodies—we 
would say that what his career manifests is a very 1990s’ trajectory from Foucault’s analysis 
CVA+C BROADSHEET 277
of specific effects of surveillance and power to a still more general analysis of what is known 
as “bio-power”. Undoubtedly, the definitive analyst of contemporary bio-power is the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who is best known for his revival of the mediaeval notion of 
the homo sacer, the ultimately disposable individual who remains alive only at the discretion 
of his sovereign. Here is a passage from Agamben’s book Homo Sacer, which could serve as 
a perfect description of those scenes of fear, desolation and disenfranchisement Henson 
creates, in which the individual remains alone, reduced to bare existence and obscurely 
oppressed by forces that are ultimately beyond their power to control or understand. 
(And it is in light of what Agamben is saying that we would want to think of Henson’s 
typical use of the iconography of the crucifixion and deposition—it is to speak of a 
certain desacralisation, the fall of Christ into the realm of the human.) Agamben writes:
What confronts us today is a life that as such is exposed to a violence 
without precedent precisely in the most profane and banal ways. If it 
is true that the figure proposed by our age is that of an unsacrificeable 
life that nevertheless becomes capable of being killed to an unprecedented 
degree, then the bare life of homo sacer concerns us in a special way. 
Sacredness is a line of flight present in contemporary politics, a line 
that is as much moving into zones increasingly vast and dark, to the 
point of ultimately coinciding with the biological life itself of citizens.8
It is, of course, this notion of an absolute yet unspecifiable damage that is the one 
employed by the child protection advocates who range themselves against Henson. 
It is just this threat of an imminent but undetermined danger through the technological 
dissemination of images that allows them to turn the child into the defining and 
unquestionable—that is, post-political—issue of our time. For the child today is the 
absolute model of politics as bio-politics, that which cannot be sacrificed at any cost, 
that which can be ‘killed’ but not ‘sacrificed’. And insofar as today we are all homines sacri 
we are also all children, as shown symptomatically by the notion (the problem supposedly 
facing Henson’s models) that some image once taken of us as a child will one day turn 
up to haunt us on the internet. Everyone is hypothetically at risk with the possibility of 
pornographic images travelling unchecked all over the world and being seen in limitless 
contexts, the very fantasy of technological omnipotence itself. It is as though none of us is 
any more able to choose what to see, hear or think when confronted by the ubiquitousness 
of the internet. We are just as powerless looking at images as when we appear in them. 
This innocence or childishness is what must be protected or prolonged at all costs. In the 
reduction of the social to the biological, we lose all sense of risk, of agency, all sense of 
the future, of the human project, ultimately of the political. 
In other words, for all of the irony of stating this, Henson is photographing the very bodies 
that the child protection agencies themselves speak in the name of. In his work, we have 
the same children and the same idea of illimitable but undetermined danger that they seek 
to protect us from. Or, to put this the other way around, these child protection advocates 
reveal the hidden side of Henson’s art—not that he is in any way a pedophile, but that he 
shares the same fears as them of the loss of any distinctive human agency as we are turned 
into a cowering and defenceless animal, overcome by impulses and addictions that we can 
neither control nor understand. The world that Henson depicts is the same one that the child 
advocates themselves so obsessively conjure up. In the worst sense, his is a depoliticised 
art, an art of contemporary bio-power. For all of Henson’s and his critics’ pointing to the 
transcendent power of art, in fact for them art is reduced to a sensation, a biological 
reaction, beyond the power of human thought or theorisation. In effect, the art is nihilist, 
without any sense of a human destiny, except to maintain us as children in a kind of 
permanent limbo at the pleasure of an invisible sovereign, without any sense of higher 
value than the perpetuation of life itself at any cost.9
Some two months after the ‘Henson Affair’, Art Monthly Australia decided to intervene 
in the ongoing furore over Henson’s images. It was done, declared the editor in vague 
and ill-chosen words, in the “hope of restoring some dignity to the debate”.10 The front 
cover of the issue featured a work by Melbourne photographer Polixeni Papapetrou of her 
daughter, the rather notably named (in this context) Olympia—the first of several art-
historical quotations we would have to consider here. It was a work taken from Papapetrou’s 
2003 Dreamchild series, Olympia as Lewis Carroll’s Beatrice Hatch, which recreated author 
of Alice in Wonderland Charles Dodgson’s c. 1850 image Beatrice Hatch before the White 
Cliffs. Inside the magazine were two other images by Papapetrou, which featured Olympia 
wearing the artist’s mother’s jewellery, Olympia wearing her grandmother’s jewellery #1 
and #2 (2001). These images by Papapetrou too provoked great controversy, with accusations 
that the artist was negligent as a parent for allowing her daughter to be photographed in this 
way, that she was somehow seeking to cash in on the attention that Henson had received 
and with calls by politicians and others that the magazine be closed down or at least have 
its government subsidy withdrawn. Currently, in the wake of the two incidents, the Australia 
Council has been asked by the federal Arts Minister to draw up protocols governing the 
depiction of children in art.11
Here, I want to begin by questioning the common art world assumption that works of art, 
in the words of the editor of Art Monthly, are able to “restore some dignity to”, that is, 
participate in, a “debate”. It is a discursivity or rhetoricity, the idea that art has essentially 
a critical meaning, that Papapetrou’s images with their series of quotations from art history 
are complicit in. But, as the course of the debate revealed, with its literal misdescription 
of what was in the images, with the imputation of the wildest motives to their making, with 
the whole reality as well as fantasy of images being seen in the most divergent contexts, 
works of art are hardly able to speak for themselves, appearing increasingly powerless as 
the means of their technological dissemination rapidly increase. Papapetrou’s images hardly 
featured in the debate, but served mostly as an excuse or pretext for what was going to be 
said anyway. We were never more conscious than during the debate of the “fragility” of the 
image, of the difficulty of saying what we see or producing a symbolic—mutually agreed-
upon, performatively binding—consensus around what we say we see. We had a sense of how 
little it counts as to what is actually in the image and of indicating to others what is in it.
Indeed—this is the second irony of Art Monthly’s intervention—if we for our part could say 
what is shown by Papapetrou’s Olympia as Beatrice Hatch, we would suggest that it is in 
fact an implicit critique of Henson’s work. For, when we look at Papapetrou’s photograph 
closely, what is it that we see? What is it that the artist is trying to point to or represent? 
It is not something that, for all of the explicitness or obviousness of the image, is 
immediately apparent. It is only to be seen if we look carefully into the eyes of the 
child (which crucially, unlike the Dodgson original, meet those of the viewer). What we 
see in the eyes of the model, what Papapetrou is trying to figure in her work is, if it can 
put it this way, the ultimate obscenity in our culture that which cannot be shown or has 
no way of being represented (which is why Papapetrou does not depict it as such). It is 
the love between a mother and her child. What Papapetrou is attempting to photograph in 
Olympia as Beatrice Hatch is not only her child’s look onto her but her look onto her child.
And in the other photographs in Art Monthly, in which Olympia is shown wearing her 
grandmother’s, that is, the photographer’s mother’s jewellery, there is again the same 
averted, displaced or only indirectly represented relationship between mother and child. 
In a way, what the photographer is attempting to capture is herself, seen in her mother’s 
eyes by photographing her child seen in her own. What she is attempting to express in her 
work is the idea that the only way of reciprocating the love we receive as a child, which by 
definition cannot be returned because it precedes who we are, is by bestowing the same 
love upon another. What Papapetrou is seeking to do in these images is imagine herself 
looking back at her mother by means of her child looking back at her. There is something 
quite moving about the unspoken (but not yet quite) reciprocal look of trust with which 
the daughter looks back at her mother in the images in which she is exposed, as though 
being assured that what she is doing is alright. There is a very subtle interplay between 
the innocent look out and the experienced look upon, as though the photographer was 
seeing herself as a child looking out through her eyes at the adult she will become.
This series of images, as remarked upon in the media, was in fact taken several years 
before their publication in Art Monthly, when the photographer’s daughter was much 
younger. And indeed, one of the intriguing things about Papapetrou’s career as her 
children grow older is that she photographs the gradual breaking of the relationship 
between mother and daughter. If what we see in the passage from Olympia wearing her 
grandmother’s jewellery to Olympia as Lewis Carroll’s Beatrice Hatch is a more reciprocal 
look—as though the child were increasingly able to look back at us with the same look as ours 
upon her—what the later works go on to show is through this reciprocity the artist’s children 
becoming more active and autonomous. It is here that we might say the quotational or even 
allegorical aspects of Papapetrou’s images take effect (and there is something important 
in the fact that these later images are allegorical rather than the biographies or even 
autobiographies of the earlier work—there is a distancing even in their formal means). 
We are thinking here, for example, of Papapetrou’s 2006 series Haunted Country, which 
features a series of lost children, inspired both by paintings like Frederick McCubbin’s 
Lost Child (1886) and literary and newspaper accounts of lost and endangered children. 
Of course, what is being spoken of here is the loss of her children to the photographer 
herself, as they grow older. And notably the subjects of these photographs do not look 
at the lens of the camera. The previous connection between the photographer and her 
subject, even if indirect, is foregone. Instead, Papapetrou shows us groups of independent, 
increasingly self-organising children socialising and communicating amongst themselves. 
There is not here the despair and desolation of Henson—the children are self-directed, 
volitional. If lost, they do not remain the subject a distant gaze they cannot escape, but 
increasingly wander off into their own space where they can no longer be seen.12 This is the 
true loss the images point to, which would be the notional end of Papapetrou’s project, all 
the more powerful for following the growing subjectivity and personhood of her children 
(there is indeed a narrative to her oeuvre, as opposed to the static reiteration of Henson).
There is something undeniably kitsch about Papapetrou’s work, and the response to her 
intervention and the renewed scrutiny of her photographs was by and large unfavourable. 
And in truth, works featuring the mother-daughter relationship can only appear anachronistic 
in a culture in which there is no place for a mother’s love, in which everything is reduced 
to the physical or biological, and in which the materialism of Henson’s work seems the very 
definition of ‘art’ itself. There appears no way of representing the love of a mother for her 
child—the underlying subject of Papapetrou’s work shorn of its citationality and perhaps what 
this seeks to avoid—without appearing sentimental. (It would be very interesting to compare 
Papapetrou’s work in this regard with that of Del Kathryn Barton.13) This is the argument of 
the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, that what constitutes our society is the exclusion or 
repression of the mother-child relationship. As she writes:
Patriarchy has disrupted the mother-daughter relationship through an 
act of matricide. As patriarchy reduced women to their relationship to 
motherhood, the woman-mother and woman-lover is erased in favour of 
the mother-reproducer... In a sense we need to establish a women-to-
woman relationship of reciprocity with our mother, in which they might 
possibly also feel themselves to be our daughters.14
For Irigaray, it is this mother-daughter relationship that might open up, or require, a new 
possibility of the spiritual or divine: “Does respect for God made flesh not imply that we 
should incarnate God within us and in our sex: daughter-woman-mother.”15
It is at this point that we see the true art historical source for Papapetrou’s art—the Madonna 
and Child. It is a feminised Madonna and Child, one that sees the mother-child relationship 
as the true sign of divinity in this world, as well as opening up a rethinking of the traditional 
notion of divinity with its father-son emphasis. Papapetrou, along the lines of what Irigaray 
suggests throughout her work, seeks to find a new way of thinking the mother-child 
relationship in terms that do not see it as subservient to the masculine. It is not perhaps 
any direct idea of God that is at stake here, but rather the idea of a certain “goal” that 
“gives us the authority to grow” in holding out the “possibility of a present and future”.16 
It was indeed, the question of how the depiction of children in art could be pornographic 
if we think of the Madonna and Child that many commentators, writers of letter to papers 
and those who left messages on blogs spontaneously brought up during the controversy over 
Papapetrou’s work. It is an intuitively correct insight because it is pornography (the de facto 
state of all images today) that is the very symptom of our current regime of bio-power. 
When the body is depoliticised, reduced to the physical, it is unable to offer any resistance 
to the gaze, has no sense of interiority, can keep no secrets. It is this understanding of 
the body that both Henson and the child protection advocates share: the body endlessly 
endangered, scattered to the four winds, either by the internet or by that “chemical and 
mineral roiling” spoken of by Schjeldahl, and unable to constitute any kind of a political 
project with a future dimension. Papapetrou’s work by contrast, concerns the paradox of a 
mother teaching her child to be free, giving to it the impossible gift of will, autonomy, the 
ability freely to consent. This is of course, the fundamental religious paradox, commented 
upon endlessly for example in all Christian theologies.
It is tempting to oppose a certain feminine to a masculine here, but in truth not even 
the opposition between the religious and the irreligious is adequate to the distinction 
I seek to draw. I am certainly not making an argument for the return of religion or even 
a more generalised spirituality in art here. In the end, Irigaray’s recent turn to Eastern 
religion, yoga and tantrism is a little too New Age for me. But I think that Papapetrou’s art 
is the true antidote to both Henson and the childhood protection lobby, which are both an 
outcome of the reduction of politics to bio-politics. It is a state in which the child becomes 
the emblem of all of us, the contemporary version of the homo sacer. It is to begin to think 
that any proposed law to control the depiction of children in art would be itself the problem, 
would bring about the thing it fears, in exactly what Agamben analyses as that “state of 
exception” that allows the general rule. As soon as we understand the body as subject to 
law, we are already in an irreversible relationship to pornography and total exposure—all 
images, all bodies, all looking at images, are by definition guilty. So that, in the final instance 
of the letter returning, it is just those who accuse the work of Henson and Papapetrou of 
being “revolting” who are already in the realm of pedophilia,“beautiful souls” who while 
apparently standing outside, are in fact bringing about the very situation they lament.
This essay was originally presented at a panel entitled ‘How Good is Contemporary Art? 
Ethics and Aesthetics in Art’, Hyde Park Hotel, Perth, for the Bureau of Ideas, Perth, 
4 August 2008. 
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Opposite: composite screen-grabs of several print media website representations of 
Bill Henson’s seized photographs. The image at bottom left is the one used on the front 
of the invitation, without the black bar, of course!
